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Drug possession lawyer | Paulding county criminal defense lawyer

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Thu, 09 Aug 2012 20:53:00 GMT

B Purchase, Possession, or Manufacture of Controlled Substances

The most important criminal provisions of the Controlled Substances Act appear in §§ 16-13-30, 16-13-31, and 16-13-33. Section 16-13-30(a) prohibits the purchase, possession, or control of a controlled substance and subsection (b), the more serious crime, prohibits the manufacture, delivery, distribution, dispensing, administration, sale or possession with intent to distribute all controlled substances.Subsections (c) through (h) outline the punishment provisions for subsection (a) and (b) offenses with regard to each of the five schedules. Generally, subsection (b) offenses are more heavily punished than subsection (a) offenses and crimes involving the Schedule I and II substances are treated more severely than those involving Schedules III, IV and V. All are felonies and several provide enhanced punishment for recidivists.

Subsection (i) of § 16-13-30 outlines a felony for the possession, manufacture, delivery, distribution, dispensing, administration, purchase, sale or possession with intent to distribute of a counterfeit controlled substance.³⁰ Subsection (j) broadly prohibits the possession, manufacture, delivery, distribution, dispensing, administration, purchase, sale or possession with intent to distribute of marijuana, an unscheduled drug. This offense is a felony, punishable by one to ten years imprisonment, with enhanced punishment for those whose violation involves more than 10 pounds of marijuana.Subsection (k) makes it unlawful for any person to hire, solicit, engage, or use an individual under the age of 17 years, in any manner, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing, on behalf of the solicitor, any controlled substance, counterfeit substance, or marijuana unless the manufacturing, distribution, or dispensing is otherwise allowed by law. This offense is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than five years nor more than 20 years or by a fine not to exceed $20,000, or both. Subsection (l) outlines the punishment provisions for subsection (a) and (b) offenses with regard to flunitrazepam, a Schedule IV controlled substance. These offenses are punishable as felonies, and enhanced punishment is provided for recidivists.

C Trafficking in Controlled Substances

Section 16-13-31 prohibits and punishes trafficking in (1) cocaine, (2) illegal drugs such as morphine or heroin, (3) marijuana, (4) methaqualone, and (5) methamphetamine or amphetamine. This Code section creates a schedule of punishments scaled to the amount of contraband involved, and there is a mandatory punishment for each gradation of the crime.

Section 16-13-31.1 prohibits and punishes trafficking in the amphetamine or methamphetamine commonly known as MDMA or ecstasy. This Code section creates a schedule of punishments scaled to the amount of MDMA or ecstasy involved, and there is a mandatory punishment for each gradation of the crime.

D Attempt and Conspiracy Offenses

Section 16-13-33 makes it a crime to conspire or attempt to commit any offense under the Act.³² Unlike the general attempt and conspiracy crimes,however, the § 16-13-33 offenses are punishable to the same extent as the object offenses toward which they are directed.Under the Act, the conspiracy offense and the object offense are separate crimes and do not merge.

E Head Shop Act

There are several other sections in the Act which define criminal offenses. Sections 16-13-32 through 16-13-32.2, the “Head Shop Act,” make it a misdemeanorfor any person or corporation, knowing the drug related nature of the object, to distribute to any person any drug related object.

F Counterfeiting of Controlled Substances

Section 16-13-30.1 punishes the counterfeiting of controlled substances. The punishment provision imposes imprisonment of one to ten years and/or fine of up to $25,000.³⁷ Section 16-13-30.2provides that anyone who knowingly manufactures, distributes, or possesses with intent to distribute an imitation controlled substance is guilty of a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature.³⁸Where under the evidence § 16-13-30.2 cannot be considered a lesser included offense of § 16-13-30.1, one who has been charged with violating § 16-13-30.1 would not be entitled, upon request, to a charge on § 16-13-30.2 as a lesser included offense.³⁹

Both § 16-13-30.1 and § 16-13-30.2 prohibit the sale of fake illegal drugs. Using the same evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's conduct violates both§ 16-13-30.1, a felony, and § 16-13-30.2, a misdemeanor. Because the same conduct constitutes both a felony and a misdemeanor, therefore, the rule of lenity requires that the defendant be subjected to the penalties for the misdemeanor, rather than the felony.⁴⁰

G Possession of Ephedrine, Pseudoephedrine, or Phenylpropanolamine

Section 16-13-30.3(b) prohibits any person, other than a pharmacist, medical practitioner, or retail distributor, from knowingly possessing any product that contains an excessive amount of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine.⁴¹ In addition, this provision prohibits any person from possessing any amount of these substances with the intent to manufacture amphetamine or methamphetamine. A violation of § 16-13-30.3(b) is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years.

Section 16-13-30.3(b.1) limits the sale and manner of sale of products containing pseudoephedrine so as to limit their use in the unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine. This Code provision makes it a misdemeanor to offer such products for retail sale without blister packaging and by self-service.In addition, it is a misdemeanor under this provision to deliver in a single over the counter sale more than three packages of any product containing pseudoephedrine or any number of packages that contain a combined total of more than nine grams of pseudoephedrine.A knowing violation of either of these prohibitions is punishable by a fine of not more than $500. A second or subsequent violation is punishable by not more than six months' imprisonment or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.In a prosecution for a violation of either of these prohibitions, a retailer who is in compliance with Georgia Meth Watch would be entitled to a defense if it can establish that the violation occurred unknowingly.

Section 16-13-30.3(b.1) also makes it a misdemeanor for a retail distributor to purchase any product containing pseudoephedrine from any person or entity other than a licensed manufacturer or a licensed wholesale distributor. A second or subsequent violation is punishable as a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature.

Section 16-13-30.3(d) prohibits any person from possessing, controlling, manufacturing, delivering, distributing, dispensing, administering, purchasing, selling, or possessing with intent to distribute any substance containing any amount of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, phenylpropanolamine, or any of their salts, optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers which have been altered from their original condition so as to be powdered, liquefied, or crushed. This prohibition does not apply to any substance which is possessed or altered for a legitimate medical purpose. A violation of § 16-13-30.3(d) is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years.

The prohibitions in § 16-13-30.3 do not apply to certain pediatric products and products exempted by the Georgia State Board of Pharmacy.

Section 16-13-30.4(g)(1) prohibits any person who sells, transfers, receives, or possesses a product containing pseudoephedrine from (1) knowingly failing to comply with the statute's reporting requirements, (2) knowingly making a false statement in a required report or record, or (3) knowingly or deliberately failing to obtain a required license or permit. A violation of § 16-13-30.4(g)(1) is punishable as a misdemeanor on the first offense and as a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature on the second and subsequent offenses.

Section 16-13-30.4(g)(2) prohibits any person from possessing, selling, transferring, or otherwise furnishing a product containing pseudoephedrine with the knowledge or intent that the product will be used in the unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance. A violation of § 16-13-30.4(g)(2) is punishable as a felony by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 15 years or by a fine not to exceed $100,000, or both.

H Possession of Substances with Intent to Manufacture Controlled Substances

Section 16-13-30.5(a) prohibits any person from possessing, whether acquired through theft or other means, any substance with the intentto (1) use such substance in the manufacture of a Schedule I or Schedule II controlled substance, or (2) knowingly convey such substance to another for use in the manufacture of a Schedule I or Schedule II controlled substance. A violation § 16-13-30.5(a) is punishable as a felony by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 15 years or by a fine not to exceed $100,000, or both.Section 16-13-30.5 does not apply where possession was by a person authorized by law to dispense, prescribe, manufacture, or possess the substance in question.

Paulding county criminal defense lawyer | Dallas ga., criminal lawyer

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Thu, 09 Aug 2012 20:39:00 GMT

The Georgia Controlled Substances Act was enacted in 1974¹ at which time the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act was repealed.² The Georgia Controlled Substances Act was contained in former GCA Title 79A. With the enactment of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), the Georgia Controlled Substances Act was incorporated in the criminal code of Georgia, effective November 1, 1982.³ This Act is now contained in chapter 13 of Title 16 of the O.C.G.A. The Dangerous Drug Act,provisions dealing with the sale or possession of model glue,⁵ and other general provisions dealing with drugs were also incorporated in this chapter of the Georgia criminal code.⁶

The statutory framework of the Act will be dealt with first, followed by a brief discussion of related criminal provisions dealing with the licensing of pharmacists and pharmacies, dangerous drugs, model glue, and the Georgia Drug and Cosmetic Act.Because of the prevalence of prosecutions under the Act, this topic contains a detailed look at the case law interpreting the provisions of the Act. This topic concludes with a discussion of the punishment provisions of the Act and of the civil sanctions that may be imposed for a violation of the Act.

II Controlled Substances Act

A Schedules of Controlled Substances

The Act contains five schedules of controlled substances,each of which collects substances which are similar in their potential for abuse, medical importance and level of safety. Schedule I includes the most dangerous drugs and Schedule V the least dangerous.Section 16-13-30(a) enacts a broad prohibition of the purchase, possession, or control of any controlled substance.Section 16-13-30(b) prohibits the manufacture, delivery, distribution, dispensing, administration, possession with intent to distribute and sale of any controlled substance.

Schedule I drugs have a high potential for abuse, have no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, and there is a lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision schedule I includescertain opiates, opium derivatives, and hallucinogens (including LSD, mescaline, peyote phencyclidine, and tetrahydrocannabinol).

Schedule II drugs have a high potential for abuse, have currently accepted medical uses in treatment in the United States, and, if abused, may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.Included in Schedule II are opium and opiates (including raw and powdered opium, codeine and morphine), cocaine, coca leaves, certain opiates (including methadone), stimulants (including amphetamine) and depressants (including amobarbital, secobarbital and pentobarbital).

Schedule III drugs have a potential for abuse less than those in Schedules I and II, have currently accepted medical uses in the United States, and, if abused, may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence.Included in Schedule III are certain stimulants, certain depressants, substances containing limited narcotic concentrations, and anabolic steroids.

Schedule IV contains drugs with a low potential for abuse relative to the drugs in Schedule III, with currently accepted medical uses in the United States, and, if abused, may, relative to Schedule III drugs, lead to limited physical or psychological dependence.

Schedule V includes drugs with a low potential for abuse relative to Schedule IV drugs, with currently accepted medical uses in the United States, and, relative to Schedule IV drugs, if abused, may lead to limited physical or psychological dependence.Substances with very limited narcotic concentrations are included in Schedule V.

The specific drugs included in each schedule are listed in §§ 16-13-25 through 16-13-29. While the General Assembly enacted the original listings and has since modified them,the Act also provides for new inclusions or rescheduling through administrative action of the Board of Pharmacy. While the Supreme Court of Georgia, in Sundberg v. State,held a similar delegation of authority in a prior drug statute to be unconstitutional under the State Constitution,the delegation under the current Act has not yet been successfully challenged. In Harmon v. State,the court avoided ruling on the question because the defendant was convicted of the sale of a substance which had not been affected by any action of the Board of Pharmacy. It should be noted that, unlike the statute struck down in Sundberg, § 16-13-22 of the current Act contains a detailed list of factorswhich are to be considered by the Board of Pharmacy in rescheduling or adding substances. The 4-3 Sundberg decision stressed the fact that there were no guidelines in the delegation provision of that statute.

Child abandonment charge | contact a Paulding county lawyer today

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Thu, 09 Aug 2012 20:27:00 GMT

The title on domestic relations contains a number of criminal provisions concerning the parent-child relationship. The most important of these, § 19-10-1,makes it a misdemeanor for either parent to abandon a child. Two elements are required to be proved to support a conviction for abandonment: (1) willful and voluntary abandonment of the child by its parent;and (2) leaving the child “in a dependent and destitute condition.”The statute defines “a dependent condition” as leaving the child without “sufficient food, clothing, or shelter.” The statute is applicable regardless of the status of the child as legitimate or born out of wedlock.

The evidence necessary to sustain an abandonment conviction differs depending on whether the abandoned child is alleged to be legitimate or born out of wedlock, since in the latter case the evidence must show not only abandonment but also that the accused is the biological father of the child.Thus, an accusation which fails to clearly allege whether the child is legitimate or born out of wedlock, so as to enable the defendant to make his defense to this specific allegation, is subject to a special demurrer.

The law does not require the parent accused of abandonment to be domiciled in Georgia in order for this state to have jurisdiction. If the parent leaves his children in another state and the children subsequently come into this state and are dependent and destitute here, the offense is complete once the parent recognizes them in some way, as his family, after they have come into this state. The offense of abandonment is therefore completed in this state at that time, and jurisdiction is proper in Georgia.

Venue of a prosecution for child abandonment is in the county where the minor children first become dependent upon others for support.

Because the blood sample of a defendant in a child abandonment case potentially would be tangible evidence of parentage, which is an element of the crime charged, a search warrant is an appropriate vehicle for obtaining a blood sample from a defendant. When the state requests pretrial paternity blood testing for a defendant charged with child abandonment, the state must initially pay the cost. A verdict incorporating a finding of parentage would authorize the court to tax the cost of the blood test against the defendant or under certain circumstances against the prosecutor/prosecutrix or complainant.The state can compel the defendant to submit to a second paternity blood test if there is no indication that the repetition of the test is unusually burdensome to the defendant or precipitated by any negligence on the part of the state.An expert in biology is permitted to give his opinion based on the blood test results about the defendant's paternity.

The failure to prove paternity beyond a reasonable doubt does not necessarily mean that the defendant is not the father of the abandoned child. When a jury entertains a reasonable doubt as to the parentage of the defendant without being convinced that the defendant is not the parent, the only authorized form of the verdict is a general acquittal. Where the evidence of paternity is inconclusive, a special verdict as to the issue of paternity is not authorized.

One child abandonment case, Padova v. State,has held that a contract entered into between the parents of a child cannot be a defense to a § 19-10-1 prosecution because the rights of the child cannot be bargained away by the parents.It has also been held that a child support provision of a divorce decree provides no bar to a subsequent prosecution for abandonment.

In Georgia, a noncustodial parent is bound by duty and by law to support his child irrespective of whether the child owns property or has money sufficient to support himself and irrespective of whether the custodial parent may have an estate that is ample to support the child, and irrespective of any agreement the custodial parent may make as to such support. If the noncustodial parent does not comply with that duty imposed upon him by law, then this is intentional and wilful, voluntary abandonment as provided in § 19-10-1. This Code section refers to both parents, and makes it obvious that it is no defense as to one of them that the other has met the duties of support which he has failed to assume.

Although normally child abandonment is a misdemeanor, if the parent leaves the state it becomes a felony, punishable by one to three years' imprisonment. Felony abandonment requires the actual physical presence of the parent in this state. Thus, if the evidence shows that the parent was never physically present and therefore has never left the state, a felony sentence is unauthorized.A third offense under the statute is also a felony with one to three years' imprisonment as punishment. The offense is defined as a continuing one with prior conviction or acquittal irrelevant so long as there has been an abandonment for thirty days prior to prosecution. Because this offense which is predicated on a failure to sufficiently provide for the needs of the child is a continuing one, the principle of res judicata cannot be used to prevent a court from implementing appropriate procedures to insure that the child is sufficiently cared for.

The exclusive remedy for modification of child support is in the trial court that heard the child abandonment case. The clear intent of the statutory scheme of § 19-10-1(j) is to allow the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the issue of child support throughout the child's minority. The statute gives the trial court an important coercive tool—the suspended sentence—to ensure that the parent provides support. Moreover, because the statute provides for the trial court to set and modify child support, it would not make sense to involve another forum in determining the amount of support for the child.

The General Assembly enacted the Safe Place for Newborns Act of 2002 in order to prevent injuries to and deaths of newborn children caused by mothers who abandon them.Under this Act, a mother who leaves her newborn child in the physical custody of an employee, agent, or staff member of a medical facilityis not subject to prosecution for the crime of abandonment of a dependent child. This exemption from prosecution is available only if the newborn child is no more than one week old at the time of relinquishment and only if the mother shows proof of her identity, if available, to the person with whom the newborn is left and provides her name and address.

Another abandonment offense is defined by § 19-10-2 which makes it a misdemeanor to abandon a pregnant wife in a dependent condition. If the abandoning husband leaves the state it is a felony punishable by one to three years' imprisonment.

Section 19-8-24(a) makes it a felony for any person or organization that has not been established as a child-placing agency by the Department of Human Resources to advertise adoptions or to hold out inducements to parents to part with their children.²Furthermore, § 19-8-24(b) makes it felony for any person to sell, offer to sell, or conspire with another to sell or offer to sell a child for money or anything of value, except as otherwise provided by the adoption law. The punishment for either of these offenses is imprisonment for up to 10 years and/or a fine of up to $10,000.

Section 19-7-5 makes the knowing and willful failure to report child abuse by those required to do so a misdemeanor.

Paulding county lawyer | what is an arrest?

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Tue, 07 Aug 2012 13:48:00 GMT

At the threshold, it must be understood that the word “arrest” has two distinct meanings. First, there is a common law, or in some states, a statutory meaning. Second, there is the federal constitutional meaning which has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court.

For the common law definition of the word “arrest,”the Georgia Court of Appeals has stated:

“An arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another, either by touching or putting hands on him, or by any act indicating an intention to take such person into custody, and which subjects such person to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest. It is sufficient if the arrested person understands that he is in the power of the one arresting and submits in consequence thereof. The taking of another into custody for the purpose of investigating an alleged crime constitutes an arrest.”See section infra, on what constitutes a seizure.

The Georgia Supreme Court has more concisely said that “a person is under arrest whenever his liberty to come and go as he pleases is restrained, no matter how slight such restraint may be.”

In Georgia, as provided by statute, it is not necessary that a person actually be touched in order to be considered arrested. If the person voluntarily submits or gives in on the condition that he will only be allowed his freedom of movement under the direction of the officer, the arrest is complete.

In addition, it has been held that the seizure of one's property from his immediate presence is the functional equivalent of the seizure of his person. This includes the seizure and retention of personal property or money when the authorities do not make it absolutely clear how they plan to reunite the suspect and his possessions at some time and place.

These statements represent the general common-law concept of arrest.However, this is not the present federal constitutional concept of the term “arrest” or the term “custodial arrest.”

Under the federal constitutional concept of arrest, a greater degree of intrusion or restraint is required in order to have an arrest than that which was required at common law. For example, a “stop and frisk” in terms of federal constitutional law amounts to a seizure, not to an arrest; and it does not require probable cause.⁷ However, in common-law terms a “stop and frisk” at least generally appears to be an arrest. The person frisked is certainly at least slightly restrained. On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court in the Terrycase made it clear that the Fourth Amendment applies to “seizures” as well as to arrests.

Thus, from a federal constitutional standpoint, the terms “seizure” and “arrest” or “custodial arrest” together seem to approximate the common-law concept of arrest. That is, the common-law term “arrest” applies, of course, to what the United States Supreme Court has called an “arrest” or “custodial arrest” from a federal constitutional standpoint, but the common-law term “arrest” also encompasses a “stop and frisk” or “seizure” as defined by the Supreme Court.

The nomenclature used by the United States Supreme Court is important because a “seizure” or “stop and frisk” is valid if based on reasonable suspicion, which is grounded upon specific and articulable facts, judged against an objective standard. However, when such a “search” is permissible the “search” accompanying such a seizure is much more restricted than in the case of a search incident to a lawful “arrest,” as that term is used by the Supreme Court. There may not be a federal constitutional “arrest” in the absence of probable cause, but if there is probable cause (and the arrest is otherwise valid) the search conducted incident to such an arrest may be much broader than in the “stop and frisk” or “seizure” situation. However, where a person thought to be only an eyewitness to a shooting was asked to wait in the back of a police car until he could be questioned about the shooting, and the “witness” made an incriminating statement when a detective approached 17 minutes later, the court concluded that from a federal constitutional standpoint the seizure was reasonable and a less severe intrusion than a traditional arrest and thus declined to suppress the statement.

In State v. Corbett,the court held that whether or not a person has been constitutionally arrested depends upon “whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have thought the detention would not be temporary.” In State v. Davis,Judge Johnson pointed out that “[a] person has been ‘seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person …, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.”

It should be noted, however, that notwithstanding the foregoing, not every custodial restraint of an individual by a police officer will constitute an “arrest.” A person taken into custody pursuant to an order of civil protective custody is not “arrested.” In Lindsey v. State,for example, an individual who was detained, placed in handcuffs and into a police cruiser and secured while being served with a civil order authorizing the individual's detention for purposes of a mental evaluation was not deemed under “arrest” for purposes of a Fourth Amendment challenge to contraband found during the search.

In Miranda v. State,in an opinion by Judge, now Chief Justice, Benham, the Court of Appeals said there are at least three kinds of police-citizen encounters: (1) verbal encounters involving no coercion or detention, (2) brief “stops” or “seizures” which must be accompanied by reasonable suspicion, and (3) “arrests” which must be supported by probable cause.

In Quinn v. State,the court pointed out that “[n]ot all encounters between police officers and citizens involve seizures which implicate Fourth Amendment protections. . . . ‘[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions …; [and] ask to examine the individual's identification …;—as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.' ”

Criminal defense lawyer

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Mon, 30 Jul 2012 20:02:00 GMT

Whether dependent upon direct or circumstantial evidence, the true question in criminal cases is not whether it is possible that the conclusion at which the evidence points may be false, but whether there is sufficient evidence to satisfy the mind and conscience beyond a reasonable doubt.

“The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation.” The necessity of proof by the state beyond a reasonable doubt constitutional right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

Georgia statutes also establish the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt before a defendant may be found guilty.It has been held that “the phrases, ‘to a moral and reasonable certainty’ and ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ as applied to the quality of proof in a case, are identical in meaning.” However, in Marion v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the better practice is for the trial judge to omit the phrase “moral and reasonable certainty” from the jury charge.

In Whitt v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court held that it was error for a trial judge to charge a jury that the state is not “required to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond all reasonable doubt, but [is] required to prove [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.)

All elements of a crime as well as every material allegation in the indictment must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify a conviction.

A reasonable doubt may arise from the presence or lack of evidence as well as from other factors.In the final analysis, the jury must determine whether a reasonable doubt exists, but “[g]uilt beyond a reasonable doubt must be determined solely on admissible evidence of probative value.”

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean that the district attorney must prove the case beyond all doubt,nor does it mean proof to a mathematical certainty. In Lavji v. State, the court considered a charge which included the statement that “if ‘you are unable to say with reasonable certainty that he is guilty then you should acquit him.’ ” The court concluded that since the defendant was fully and accurately charged on reasonable doubt, the use of the phrase “reasonable certainty” in the context of the charge did not constitute reversible error.

A number of Georgia cases, in considering the meaning of “a reasonable doubt,” have defined it as (1) doubt for which a juror can give a reason, (2) doubt for which a specific reason can be given, (3) the doubt of a fair-minded, impartial juror,(4) doubt which leaves the mind wavering, unsettled, and unsatisfied, and (5) doubt based on common sense and reason.However, in view of the Cage case hereinafter discussed in this section, and cases based on Cage, the accuracy of these holdings is open to question.

It is not necessary for the court to define reasonable doubt when the jury is charged.Even when there is a proper request, the court’s failure to define the term “reasonable doubt” is not error. However, it has been held that it is error for the court to charge that if the state has proved the material allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be found guilty, since such a charge restricts the jury to the state’s evidence. But it has been held that to not be error to instruct a jury that if the defendant’s guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury has a duty to convict. However, more recently the Georgia Supreme Court has “ disapproved an instruction suggesting that the jury has a duty to convict, holding that the better practice is to inform the jurors that they are authorized to convict.”

In Cage v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court found a reasonable-doubt instruction unconstitutional where it defined reasonable doubt as “such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty” and as “an actual substantial doubt,” coupled with a requirement of “moral certainty.”

In the 1994 companion cases of Victor v. Nebraska and Sandoval v. California, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is a requirement of due process in criminal cases. The Victor charge contained the phrases “to a moral certainty,” “strong probabilities of the case,” and “actual and substantial doubt,” to which the defendant objected. In Sandoval, the defendant objected to the following phrases from the charge: “not a mere possible doubt,” “depending on moral evidence,” and “to a moral certainty.” The majority concluded that, looking at the jury instructions as a whole, the use of these phrases did not render the charges unconstitutional. However, the Court noted out that it did not condone the use of the phrase “moral certainty.”

After Victor was decided, the United States Supreme Court summarily vacated the ordering of a new trial in North Carolina v. Bryant, where the state supreme court held jury instructions unconstitutional which charged that “beyond a reasonable doubt” meant (1) “satisfied to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge,” (2) having “an abiding faith to a moral certainty in the defendant’s guilt” or (3) an “honest substantial misgiving generated by the insufficiency of the proof.”

The United States Supreme Court has set out the standards of review and analysis to be used when presented with a challenged “reasonable doubt” instruction. In Estelle v. McGuire,the Court reaffirmed that the standard of review when examining a jury instruction is to inquire “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” In Chapman v. California,the Court outlined a “harmless-error” review where reversal is not mandated if it can be shown “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”

However, in Sullivan v. Louisiana,the Court held that where a charge had been given which was “essentially identical to the one held unconstitutional in Cage …,” the harmless-error analysis of Chapman was inapplicable because the premise was absent (the state supreme court had held that the “erroneous instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). Here there was no guilty “verdict” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment because there was no “jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable doubt …. [T]he essential connection to a ‘beyond-a-reasonable-doubt’ factual finding cannot be made where the instructional error consists of a misdescription of the burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury’s findings.”

Contact a Paulding County criminal defense lawyer today if facing criminal charges.

Paulding county criminal defense lawyer | Procedure for arrests

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Sun, 29 Jul 2012 21:32:00 GMT

In situations where a lawful arrest cannot be made without a warrant, the officer should have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest or so near at hand that it can be exhibited on demand.It has been said that an officer derives no authority or power from a warrant unless he has it with him and can display it.²O.C.G.A. § 17-4-0 provides that an officer has a right to arrest with or without a warrant (1) if the offense was committed within his presence or within his immediate knowledge, or (2) if the offender is endeavoring to escape,³ or (3) if the officer has probable cause to believe an act of family violence has been committed, or (4) for other cause if there is likely to be a failure of justice from the want of a duly authorized officer to issue a warrant, or (5) if the officer has probable cause to believe that an offense involving physical abuse has been committed against a vulnerable adult who is defined as being a person 18 years old or older who is unable to protect himself or herself from physical or mental abuse.

In the absence of one of the five instances above, an officer generally has no right to arrest for a violation of a municipal ordinanceor a misdemeanorunless the officer has a warrant in his possession at the time of the attempted arrest.This is said to be true because the officer is bound to have the warrant ready to be produced if asked for. For example, in Croker v. State,the court said that where the offense involved was a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the officer and flight was not involved, the officer had no authority to arrest the defendant even though a warrant had been issued because the warrant was not accessible to the officer at the time. In the case of a felony, it is not necessary for the officer to have the warrant in his possession in order to make a valid arrest. Also, an officer may arrest without a warrant pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a) or with probable cause.See section infra. However, under Georgia law it has been held that if the officer wishes to arrest the defendant without a warrant, he should do so promptly.Without a warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances, there is no right to make an arrest in a person's home.Moreover, even when an officer has an arrest warrant, the general rule requires that the officer knock and announce his presence before entering.See section infra, on arrest warrants.

While it is provided by Georgia statute that where an officer has a warrant he may “break open the door of any house where the offender is concealed,” and it is recognized that an officer may use such force as is reasonably necessary to arrest, nevertheless, he is not authorized to use any more force than is reasonably necessary.But see section supra, on place of arrest. It has also been recognized that an officer may use more force to accomplish an arrest for a felony than for a misdemeanor.

In Tennessee v. Garner, the United States Supreme Court held a statute violative of the Fourth Amendment which permitted officers to use deadly force to prevent the escape of a suspected felon. The Court said that deadly force may not be used unless necessary to prevent escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or grave injury to the officer or others. In the case of a misdemeanor, an officer has no right to shoot merely to prevent his escape.This rule applies equally to an arrest for a violation of a municipal ordinance.However, even in the case of a misdemeanor, “in order to overcome declared, open and armed resistance to [the] execution of … [a warrant, an officer may] use such force as may be reasonably necessary to effect the arrest.”

In 1986, Georgia added to O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 a provision stating that an officer “may use deadly force to apprehend a suspected felon only when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect possesses a deadly weapon or any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury; when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses an immediate threat of physical violence to the officer or others; or when there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm. Nothing in this Code section shall be construed so as to restrict such sheriffs or peace officers from the use of such reasonable nondeadly force as may be necessary to apprehend and arrest a suspected felon or misdemeanant.”

Unless the person to be arrested knows that the person attempting to arrest him is an officer, the officer should notify him of his authority. Likewise, the person to be taken into custody should be notified of the offense with which he is being charged. If the officer has an arrest warrant, he should tell the suspect by what authority he is being arrested or should display the warrant to the accused. However, if a suspect knows he is being lawfully arrested by an officer, it is the duty of the suspect to submit quietly.

In the case of any offense involving a violation of any law or ordinance involving the operation, licensing, registration, maintenance or inspection of a motor vehicle, the officer may arrest by issuance of a citation if the offense was committed in the presence of the officer. If the offense results in an accident, an investigating officer may issue a citation regardless of whether the offense occurred in his presence. Also, a citation may be issued if the offense occurred before another officer. Any citation issued “shall enumerate the specific charges against the person and the date upon which the person is to appear and answer the charges.” If the offense occurred before another officer, “the citation shall list the name of each officer and each must be present when the charges against the accused person are heard.”

In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the United States Supreme Court held that an officer in Texas may, under the federal constitution, arrest the driver of an automobile for not wearing a seat belt even though the failure to utilize a seat belt is a non-jailable misdemeanor punishable only by a fine of not less than $25.00 or more than $50.00. Although the law permits officers to issue citations in lieu of arrest, the court pointed out that “the standard of probable cause ‘applie[s] to all arrests, without the need to ‘balance' the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations.' ”

Paulding county criminal defense lawyer | implied consent

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Sat, 28 Jul 2012 19:21:00 GMT

The concept of "implied consent" is a legal fiction, created after the advent of the automobile, to describe the "legal jargon" that identifies the rule to legally coerce motorists suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs to take a chemical sobriety test. According to this legal fiction, by using the public roadways of the state, a motorist has implicitly consented to submit to testing if a police officer has legitimate cause to believe that the driver may be impaired.

Although a few unusual cases from 40 to 60 years ago allowed an accused to challenge deficient proof in a case that alleged (but did not prove) that an offense occurred on a "public" roadwayIsenhower v. State, 88 Ga. App. 762, 77 S.E.2d 834 (1953), the law in Georgia has never made that distinction as to public property or private property. Cook v. State, 220 Ga. 463, 139 S.E.2d 383 (1964); Madden v. State, 252 Ga. App. 164, 555 S.E.2d 832 (2001)

This legal fiction has been codified into law in Georgia. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55(a) provides in part that “[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere throughout this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to Code Section 40-6-392 [chemical tests for alcohol or drugs in blood], to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath, or urine or other bodily substances, for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content of his blood if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in violation of Code Section 40-6-391. The test or tests shall be administered at the request of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere throughout this state in violation of Code Section 40-6-391.”

Prior to the Act of 1974 which enacted Title 68A, known as “The Uniform Rules of the Road,” the former law, Ga. Code Ann. § 68-1625, did not grant a motorist arrested for DUI the right to have an additional independent chemical sobriety test made at the time of his arrest. Former Ga. Code Ann. § 68A-902.1, enacted in 1974, granted the motorist arrested for DUI the important new right to request an independent chemical test and required the arresting officer to notify the motorist of his right to have an additional test.Nelson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 212, 217 S.E.2d 450 (1975); Torley v. State, 141 Ga. App. 366, 233 S.E.2d 476 (1977). The original law, however, did not require the officer to tell the person the consequences of refusing the test. Whittington v. State, 184 Ga. App. 282, 361 S.E.2d 211 (1987).

Since January 1, 1993 and the passage of the Georgia administrative license suspension law (O.C.G.A. §§ 40-5-67.1 and40-5-67.2), the legislature has added several additional “advisement” requirements. Moreover, since that time the General Assembly has amended the statutes relating to DUI law, administrative license suspensions and our implied consent advisements TWELVE TIMES since January 1, 1994. These dates of changes are January 1, 1994, July 1, 1994, January 1, 1995, April 21, 1995, August 18, 1995, July 1, 1997, March 27, 1998, May 1, 1999, July 1, 1999, July 1, 2000, July 1, 2001, and July 1, 2006.These frequent changes in the implied consent statutes have baffled not only police officers in the field, but attorneys and judges, too. If you are facing 12 months license suspension because of a refusal to submit to the test contact a Paulding county criminal defense lawyer.

Who has the power to arrest? | Paulding county criminal defense lawyer

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Thu, 26 Jul 2012 17:27:00 GMT

Ordinarily the word “officer,” for purposes of making an arrest, denotes a peace officer who is authorized by statute to make an arrest.

It should be noted that Georgia has provided by statutethat no peace officer shall exercise the power to arrest if the officer has not complied with the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act.Also, in Holstein v. Statethe court held that an officer who has not completed the requirements of the Training Act may not obtain a search warrant. However, in Davis v. Statethe court held that an officer who has completed the training requirements of the statute may arrest even though he has not yet received his certification.

In Williams v. State,the court held that a federal DEA agent had no authority as an officer to make an arrest for a misdemeanor; however, the agent had the same right as any other citizen to arrest an offender who is committing a misdemeanor in his presence.

O.C.G.A. § 17-4-25 provides in part as follows:

“(a) Under a warrant issued by a judicial officer, an arresting officer may, in any county without regard to the residence of the arresting officer, arrest any person charged with a crime. It is the duty of the arresting officer to take the accused, with the warrant under which he was arrested, to the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, for examination before any judicial officer of that county.

This section does not apply to city police officers,but does apply to state officers and county police.

In Watkins v. State,the court held that under exigent circumstances a deputy sheriff has authority to make a warrantless arrest beyond the limits of his county.

What if they have no evidence but take out a warrant for my arrest?

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Thu, 26 Jul 2012 14:48:00 GMT

By statute, Georgia law draws a distinction between so-called positive and negative evidence.Testimony that an event took place is regarded as positive testimony. Testimony of a witness that he did not see or hear a particular event is regarded as negative testimony.The rule is that if witnesses are equally credible and have the same opportunity of observation, positive testimony should outweigh that which is negative. However, a request to charge this should be granted only where the witnesses are of equal credibility.The statute provides that the positive evidence rule does not apply “when two parties have equal facilities for seeing or hearing a thing and one swears that it occurred while the other swears that it did not.”

In Thomas v. Lockwood,the court pointed out that “[d]irect and positive testimony … which is given by an unimpeached witness as to the existence of facts apparently within his own knowledge, which is not in itself incredible, impossible, or inherently improbable, and which is not contradicted directly or indirectly by proof of facts or circumstances that could be taken as incompatible with such testimony, can not be arbitrarily rejected by a … trier of the facts upon the mere surmise that it perhaps might not be in accord with the truth.” However, this rule may now only be strictly applicable, if at all, to civil cases. The language in Lockwood was quoted with approval in State v. Stokes.The Court of Appeals in State v. overruled State v. Stokes in favor of the rule announced in Tate v. Smith.There, the court held that the trier of fact “is not obligated to believe a witness even if the testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or reject any portion of the testimony.”Clear evidence “is intended to be a ‘demanding’ and ‘rigorous’ standard. In United States v. Armstrong,the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant must prove selective prosecution by “clear evidence.”

Hence, in a selective prosecution context, the defendant must show that the “prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” This requires the defendant to establish both “(1) that ‘similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted’ … and (2) that the decision to prosecute was ‘invidious or in bad faith.’ ”

Unfortunately officers take out warrants when they don't have any solid evidence indirect, or direct. When this happens it is even more crucial that you hire a Paulding County criminal defense lawyer.

Paulding County criminal defense lawyer | Contact a criminal defense lawyer

Paulding County criminal defense lawyer — Wed, 25 Jul 2012 22:43:00 GMT

By statute, Georgia law draws a distinction between so-called positive and negative evidence. Testimony that an event took place is regarded as positive testimony. Testimony of a witness that he did not see or hear a particular event is regarded as negative testimony. The rule is that if witnesses are equally credible and have the same opportunity of observation, positive testimony should outweigh that which is negative. However, a request to charge this should be granted only where the witnesses are of equal credibility. The statute provides that the positive evidence rule does not apply "when two parties have equal facilities for seeing or hearing a thing and one swears that it occurred while the other swears that it did not."

In Thomas v. Lockwood, the court pointed out that "[d]irect and positive testimony … which is given by an unimpeached witness as to the existence of facts apparently within his own knowledge, which is not in itself incredible, impossible, or inherently improbable, and which is not contradicted directly or indirectly by proof of facts or circumstances that could be taken as incompatible with such testimony, can not be arbitrarily rejected by a … trier of the facts upon the mere surmise that it perhaps might not be in accord with the truth." However, this rule may now only be strictly applicable, if at all, to civil cases. The language in Lockwood was quoted with approval in State v. Stokes. The Court of Appeals in State v. Hester overruled State v. Stokes in favor of the rule announced in Tate v. Smith. There, the court held that the trier of fact "is not obligated to believe a witness even if the testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or reject any portion of the testimony."

In Patton v. State, the court held that juries, as well as courts, are not bound to believe testimony as to facts incredible, impossible or inherently improbable. "Great physical laws of the universe are witnesses in each case, which cannot be impeached by man, even though speaking under the sanction of an oath." However, in Brandon v. State, the court held that this rule applies "in only 'extraordinary cases' … and only for statements 'which run contrary to natural law and the universal experience of mankind.' When there is nothing inherently impossible, incredible or even improbable, the rule does not apply." Further, in Stephens v. State, the court held it is error to charge this rule when there is nothing in the testimony of a defendant that was improbable or incredible. This charge may be impermissible comment on the evidence. Contact a Paulding County Criminal Defense lawyer today!

Need a Paulding county criminal defense lawyer? | call Howard Law Group

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Tue, 24 Jul 2012 19:00:00 GMT

Burden never shifts to the defense and it is incumbent on a Paulding County criminal defense lawyer to make the state prove every element of their case.

The burden is on the state up until the time of conviction to prove that the defendant is guilty as charged. The burden is never on the defendant to establish his innocence or to disprove the facts necessary to establish the crime.

It has been held that a conviction is never demanded in a criminal case if a defendant denies his guilt in his testimony. In Poole v. State, the court said, "… a verdict [of guilty] is never demanded in a criminal case in the sense that the court may direct a guilty verdict. However, where, …, the defendant makes no statement denying his guilt and the evidence authorizes only a guilty verdict, such verdict is [said to be] demanded in the sense that errors occurring on the trial may be harmless."

The defendant has neither the burden of proof nor the burden of persuasion with regard to proving the offense charged. The burden is on the state to prove every element of the crime charged and every material allegation of the accusation or indictment. The defendant in a criminal case is not required to satisfy the jury of the existence of any fact which, if true, would be a defense to the crime. It is sufficient if, from the presence or absence of the evidence, the jurors have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant.

However, the failure of the state to conduct certain examinations or investigations which might have been beneficial to the defendant does not deprive him of a fair trial. The failure of the state to thoroughly investigate is to be distinguished from the destruction of evidence.

The United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia held the "no evidence" rule unconstitutional in appellate review and held that on appeal a defendant is entitled to a reversal if it is found on the record that "no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." See Goger, Daniel's Georgia Criminal Trial Practice (2010–2011 ed.), § 28-8, on the sufficiency of evidence on appellate review.

It is error for a trial judge to charge that where the state has prima facie established the allegations of the indictment, the jury is authorized to convict unless a defense be established by a preponderance of the evidence or to charge that where the state has made out a prima facie case, evidence of a defense must be established to the jury's reasonable satisfaction before they would be authorized to acquit. However, the following charge has been approved: "… the state contends that it has shown that the defendant is guilty …. On the other hand, the defendant says that he is not guilty. He says that he has not offended the laws of the State of Georgia in any way whatsoever and he contends that he is not guilty of any offense."

The Georgia Supreme Court has concluded that a charge which places any burden on the defendant in a criminal case will be deemed erroneous. However, the usual charges on presumptions are not considered burden shifting nor are instructions that such presumptions may be rebutted.

In Shepperd v. State, the court held that it was error for the trial judge to refuse to "charge that where evidence of self-defense is presented the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense." The court also pointed out that "[w]here a defendant raises an affirmative defense and testifies to the same, the burden is on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt."

In Simmons v. State, the court, in affirming a conviction, considered several statutes making the possession of certain firearms unlawful. One statute exempted specific law enforcement officers, persons in the military, and district attorneys. The statute additionally provided that the state need not negate any of the exemptions. The court concluded that the statute was not unconstitutional. It "is burden reducing but not burden shifting." The court also pointed out that the trial judge did not charge on any exemptions until he was asked by the jury for a clarifying instruction as to exemptions relating to machine guns. On request, the court simply charged the exemptions.

Probable Cause: Have Your Rights Been Violated? | Call the Howard law group today! 678-310-3476

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Tue, 24 Jul 2012 16:06:00 GMT

If there is probable cause, a citizen can be arrested even without a warrant. However, probable cause is a tricky concept because there is not a precise definition. Yet, in situations where there is a warrantless arrest, the courts judge the facts on an objective standard. More specifically, the court asks if the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate? Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 162 (U.S. 1925). If not, the officer may have intruded upon the citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights because the search or seizure was "based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (U.S. 1968).

The legality of searches and seizures is not based on an officer's subjective motivations but on the objectively reasonable basis for the search or seizure. On the one hand, a minor traffic violation can justify a defendant's custodial arrest even though the officer actually stopped the defendant to investigate some other unlawful conduct. On the other hand, there is no probable cause to arrest a defendant even if the search reveals the defendant's alleged participation in illegal activities when the officer does not observe any illegal behavior, and when the officer does not receive information from a reliable source. Lawrence v. Georgia, 686 S.E.2d. 352, 354-55 (Ga. App. 2009).

While sometimes there is no probable cause and your constitutional rights have been violated, this is a complex topic for which a lawyer is needed to determine whether your rights have actually been violated. An incorrect determination could lead to an additional charge of resisting or evading arrest. To avoid this costly misunderstanding, you should speak to a lawyer immediately upon arrest to be sure that you are within your constitutionally guaranteed rights.

What is a crime? | Paulding County criminal defense lawyer

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Thu, 19 Jul 2012 20:36:00 GMT

OCGA 16-2-1 outlines the definition of a crime as follow:

(a) A “crime” is a violation of a statute of this state in which there is a joint operation of an act or omission to act and intention or criminal negligence.

(b) Criminal negligence is an act or failure to act which demonstrates a willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of others who might reasonably be expected to be injured thereby.

If you are charged with a crime it is important to hire an attorney who understands the state must prove all the elements of a crime. Some of these elements include intent, jurisdiction, and in act that constitutes the crime. If all those elements are not proven by the State in the prosecution of the case then the defendant should not be found guilty of the crime as charged. It is the obligation of the defense attorney representing the client charged with a crime to show the district attorney that they cannot prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt .If this is done many cases will not go to trial but will be negotiated prior to trial . Hire a Paulding County criminal defense attorney from the Howard Law Group to help you with your case.

Less safe

Georgia Criminal Defense Attorney — Thu, 19 Jul 2012 01:22:00 GMT

A common misconception among laypersons is that in order to be convicted of driving under the influence you must have a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 grams or more. While this is one way of proving that a person was driving under the influence of an intoxicant, this is not always needed for a conviction. In fact, the legal standard to show that a person was in fact driving under the influence depends on two very vague words: "less safe." What does this mean? How do the courts measure this?

First, it is important to note that there are various types of charges to be brought against a person who has allegedly been driving under the influence. There is driving under the influence per se and driving under the influence less safe. The DUI per se refers to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(5) while DUI less safe refers to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1). More specifically, a BAC of 0.08 grams or more is sufficient to show that a person was driving under the influence per se. A DUI less safe, contrastingly, can be demonstrated through circumstantial evidence and not necessarily the requisite BAC.

Just because one's BAC is lower than 0.08 grams does not mean they cannot be charged with a DUI. Parrish v. State, 456 S.E.2d 283, 284. In Parrish, the arrested driver's expert testified that his BAC should have been 0.055%, well below the legal limit. Id. However, the arresting officer observed the vehicle crossed the center line twice and smelled strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle when he approached the driver's window. Id. Additionally, when the officer administered field sobriety tests, the driver was unable to complete the test successfully, having been unable to correctly recite the alphabet, successfully walk and turn, and complete the index to nose test. Id. Although the driver's BAC was not above the legal limit, the breath test did detect alcohol. Id. Subsequently, this was sufficient evidence for a jury to convict the driver with a DUI less safe. Id.

While many assume that being under the BAC limit does not mean you can be charged with a DUI, this is an incorrect assumption. For more information concerning DUI contact a Douglasville attorney who specializes in criminal defense.

Welcome to our new Dallas, Georgia Criminal Defense Blog

Howard Law Group — Thu, 15 Mar 2012 01:27:00 GMT

We are pleased to announce the launch of our new Dallas, GA Criminal Defense Blog with an RSS feed located here.